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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
PROFESSOR GRIFFITH: Hello. Welcome to Fordham Law
School. My name is Sean Griffith. I’m the T.J. Maloney Chair in
Business Law and Professor of Law here at Fordham. I also have the
pleasure of directing the Fordham Corporate Law Center. It’s my honor
to welcome SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher here tonight to
address the “The Securities and Exchange Commission: The Next 80
Years.” The Sommer Lecture gives us the opportunity to have
Commissioner Gallagher come to Fordham Law School. This lecture
series is now celebrating its fifteenth year here at Fordham Law School
and is co-sponsored by the law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.
We’re very grateful for that sponsorship. The lecture honors the legacy
of former SEC Commissioner and securities law practitioner, Al
Sommer, who was a leader on the Commission, an outstanding lawyer,
and a mentor to many scholars and practitioners in the field of securities
law. I want to recognize the driving force behind the creation of this
lecture, John Peloso, Fordham Law School class of 1960, and senior
counsel now at Morgan Lewis. Thank you, John.
Before I turn the podium over to Ben Indek, I want to thank all of
our board members, our friends, our alums, and our students for joining
us tonight. Members of the Sommer family are with us tonight and we
thank them for continuing the great legacy of this lecture. Now, let me
turn the podium over to Ben Indek, partner at Morgan Lewis, who will
introduce our speaker.
BEN A. INDEK: Good evening everybody. On behalf of Morgan
Lewis, I welcome you to the fifteenth annual A.A. Sommer Lecture.
More than thirty years ago, Al Sommer started Morgan Lewis’ securities
law practice. So, as a way to honor that contribution to the firm, we
created this lecture series in his name. Al was a Morgan Lewis partner
from 1979 until 1994. He then became counsel to the firm. He was a
great public servant having been an SEC Commissioner, Chairman of
the Public Oversight Board, and a public member of the AICPA. In the
private sector, Al was a trusted advisor to CEOs and boards, a prolific
author, and an expert on a broad range of securities law topics. Al
participated in the first two lectures we held at Fordham Law School.
Some of you will remember him taking the microphone and pressing the
lecturer on parts of their remarks.
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Unfortunately, Al passed away in 2002. Nevertheless, we are
delighted that his family continues its close relationship with Morgan
Lewis and Fordham Law. As evidence of that, over the years, several
generations of the Sommer family have attended this event. We are
delighted that they are here this evening: Starr, Ed, Nancy, and Becky.
We’re also pleased by the continued support of the SEC Historical
Society and its Executive Director, Carla Rosati, for their contribution to
this lecture series. Al understood the important mission of the Society
and provided it both with his memories of his time at the Commission
and some of his papers, in an effort to help make the organization the
vital historical resource that it is today.
They may be separated by forty years at the SEC, but Al and our
speaker tonight, Commissioner Daniel Gallagher, have several things in
common. A dedication to public service—check. An appreciation for the
balance between regulation and capital formation—yes. Success in
private practice—check. A willingness to engage in passionate, but
respectful, debate about the role of the SEC—yes.
One other little known fact about our lecturer this evening. As
noted, this is our fifteenth year here at Fordham. During that time, we’ve
had a distinguished roster of speakers. We’ve had SEC Chairs and
Commissioners, heads of enforcement at the SEC and the UK’s FSA,
CEOs of SROs, and more. But Dan will be the first to “speak,” I’m
putting that in air quotes, twice at the Sommer Lecture. Back in 2007,
then SEC Commission Paul Atkins delivered the Eighth Annual
Sommer Lecture. 1 As Commissioner Atkins’ counsel at the time, I’m
pretty confident that Dan played a key role in crafting the remarks
delivered that night. He may not have been on stage as the lecturer, but
Dan surely had a hand in what was said. Since that time, Dan has been a
big supporter of Fordham and this series as was evident to me when he
enthusiastically accepted our invitation to speak this year.
Morgan Lewis is proud of Al Sommers’ lifelong work and his
affiliation with our firm, and we’re pleased to sponsor this annual
lecture in his honor. I am delighted to again turn the podium over to our
speaker tonight, SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher.

1. Paul S. Atkins, The Eighth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate,
Securities, and Financial Law, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 177 (2008).

626

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

LECTURE: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION – THE NEXT
80 YEARS
DANIEL GALLAGHER: Thank you, Ben [Indek], for that kind
introduction. I am truly honored to be here tonight to deliver the
15th Annual A.A. Sommer Lecture. It is a particular honor to deliver this
lecture in the presence of Al’s family. In addition to serving as an SEC
Commissioner during a particularly trying time, Al Sommer played an
impressively wide range of roles over the course of his career. To name
just a few, he was Chairman of the Public Oversight Board of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the SEC Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure, and the America Bar Association
Section of Business Law, and he was the Vice Chairman of the NASD.
The one theme that resonated throughout Al’s storied career —
well, other than being a glutton for punishment — was an unparalleled
dedication to the principles that form the tripartite mandate of the SEC:
the maintenance of fair, orderly, and efficient markets, the facilitation of
capital formation, and investor protection. This dedication was always
evident in his indelible and tremendously positive contributions to the
field of securities regulation and explains why, four decades after his
service on the Commission and a dozen years after his passing, we
gather every year to honor his legacy.
Al was not partisan, nor was he a mere bureaucrat. He was a
principled, passionate, and tremendously sophisticated advocate for both
investors and the growth-promoting, job-creating capital markets, and he
did not see any contradiction in that. He knew that strong, fair, and
transparent markets that aid capital formation benefit both the individual
investor and our economy as a whole. He was, in short, the paradigm of
a dedicated public servant, and though I never had the good fortune to
meet him, he represents to me everything a Commissioner should strive
— and that I do strive — to be.
As many of you are aware, 2014 marks the SEC’s 80th anniversary.
Tonight, I’d like to discuss a topic that I believe would have been of
critical interest to Al Sommer: the future — the next 80 years — at the
SEC. Over the next eight decades, the SEC’s fate will be intertwined, as
it always has been, with that of our capital markets. Despite robust
market activity over the last few years, the U.S. capital markets, the
manner in which they are regulated, and the SEC itself collectively face
an existential threat: the encroaching imposition of so-called prudential
regulation on markets wholly unsuited to that regulatory paradigm. To
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put it simply, the manner in which the Commission responds to this
encroachment, as well as to the unprecedented, decade-long burden
placed upon us by a hundred Dodd-Frank Act mandates,2 will determine
whether the SEC remains as relevant in the 21st century as it was in the
20th — and more importantly, whether our capital markets, still the best
in the world despite an onslaught of self-inflicted frictions, can continue
to be the drivers of economic growth and prosperity that they have been
for so long.
Before discussing the way forward, it’s important to understand
what the SEC is today and how it evolved to this point over the past 80
years. The “What We Do” section of our website states, “First and
foremost, the SEC is a law enforcement agency.” 3 I respectfully, but
firmly, disagree with that statement as a point of fact. For much of the
twentieth century, with limited exceptions,4 the Commission lacked civil
penalty authority against either individuals or corporations. Instead, the
agency was limited to seeking injunctions and other equitable remedies,
such as stop orders, disgorgement, and officer-and-director bars.5 The
SEC’s Division of Enforcement was not created until 1972,6 and it was
not until 1984 that Congress gave the Commission authority to seek
civil penalties in insider trading cases,7 which it supplemented in 1988.8
In 1990, Congress passed the Remedies Act, 9 which gave the
2. This figure includes both rulemakings and formal studies mandated by
Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act.
3. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, WHAT WE DO, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2015); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, HOW
INVESTIGATIONS
WORK,
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/
1356125787012 (last visited Apr. 19, 2015).
4. For example, violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and limited
penalty authority for issuers who failed to file certain required reports.
5. See S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 7 & n.8 (1990) (noting that the SEC did have
penalty authority against companies for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and limited penalty authority for issuers who failed to file certain required reports).
6. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, THIRTY EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION xxvii (1972), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1970/197
2_0630_SECAR.pdf.
7. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984).
8. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
9. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
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Commission, among other things, robust penalty authority against
individuals and nuanced penalty authority, meant to be used judiciously
— and certainly not in a manner that would further harm already injured
shareholders — against corporate issuers.10
Now, none of this is meant in any way to diminish the importance
of the SEC’s enforcement role or the excellence of our Enforcement
staff. It is, however, important to put the SEC’s enforcement role in
perspective. To this day, apparently unbeknownst to some elected
officials, we have no criminal authority — criminal sanctions remain
within the purview of the Department of Justice. And, I’m sorry to
disappoint fans of The Simpsons and Arrested Development, but the
SEC has neither SWAT teams nor patrol boats.11
As I stated in a speech earlier this year, the SEC is, first and
foremost, a disclosure agency.12 Indeed, one of the most important of the
countless services performed by Al Sommer was his chairmanship of the
Commission’s Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure. In
November 1977, the Committee issued its report, which stated, among
other things, “Reliable and timely information sufficient to the needs of
those who have the responsibility for the allocation of investment . . .
resources is essential to the efficient allocation of resources in any
economy.” The report stressed the need for a “mandate to assure that
sufficient, timely and reliable information is available to investment
decision-makers” and concluded that the SEC was “the appropriate
agency to provide such assurance.”13
To return, then, to my theme this evening, the Committee’s report,
which is still worth reading almost four decades later, is consistent with
what I believe are two key guideposts that will ensure the Commission’s
continued relevance and success over the next eight decades. First, the
10. Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, “Remarks at Columbia Law School
Conference (Hot Topics: Leading Current Issues in Securities Regulation and
Enforcement)” (Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/
Detail/Speech/1370540386071.
11. See ”The Ziff Who Came to Dinner” (The Simpsons, Season 15, Episode 14);
“Pilot” (Arrested Development, Season 1, Episode 1); “Development Arrested”
(Arrested Development, Season 3, Episode 13).
12. Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the
Forum for Corporate Directors, Orange County, California (Jan. 24, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540680363#.VDLJhBC8-6I.
13. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG.,
REP. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE II (Comm. Print 1977).
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need to maintain our focus on the basic, blocking-and-tackling,
everyday regulation for which the Commission was established, and
second, the need to carry out our tripartite mandate in the face of
innumerable distractions and, especially, the encroachment of prudential
regulators and the prudential model of regulation on the capital markets.
We must not let the prudential regulators’ shiny new issues du
jour distract us from our core mission.
The first guidepost requires little explanation. To be blunt, many, if
not most, of the 100 mandates imposed upon the Commission by the
Dodd-Frank Act do not by any measure represent the best use of the
Commission’s time and resources. Most obviously, whether one views
the SEC as a disclosure agency or an enforcement agency, sociopolitical
issues such as conflict minerals and extractive resources, while perhaps
worthy of attention by the right entities, should not be part of the SEC’s
agenda. Rulemakings for such issues contribute neither to the
maintenance of fair, orderly, and efficient markets, nor the facilitation of
capital formation, nor investor protection. They are the creations of
special interest groups every bit as strong as K Street lobbyists, and they
severely sap the finite bandwidth of the SEC. As Chair White rightfully
noted in this very same venue last year, “[T]he independence of the
agency . . . should be respected by those outside, including the industry,
other agencies, Congress and the courts. That independence — and the
agency’s unique expertise — should be, for example, respected by those
who seek to effectuate social policy or political change through the
SEC’s powers of mandatory disclosure.”14
Even the more relevant Dodd-Frank mandates have forced the
Commission to radically restructure its priorities. For example, a
mandate to regulate securities-based swaps is certainly germane to the
work of the Commission, but these products represent a mere 5% of the
swaps market, with the other 95% falling under the jurisdiction of the
CFTC. To be blunt once again, our swaps rulemaking has taken up a
wildly disproportionate amount of the Commission’s attention. If we are
to survive for the next 80 years as the independent, expert agency that
has produced the imperfect but unparalleled successes of the past eight
decades in overseeing capital markets and protecting investors, we
simply must regain control of our agenda. As I’ve said many times over
14. Mary Jo White, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Lecture: The Importance of
Independence, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 4 (2014).
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the past three years, even if we did nothing other than Dodd-Frank work
from this point forward, it would still take over half a decade or more to
address all of those mandates — by which point the agency would be
unrecognizable and potentially irrelevant. We must approach the
gargantuan task of fulfilling our 60 or so remaining Congressional
mandates with a clear and logical vision of what is important for
investors, markets, and the country.15 Sadly, no such paradigm has been
applied in the over four years since the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted,
and the trend will continue as we consider uber-political items like
credit risk retention and pay ratio in the coming weeks and months.
This brings us to the second guidepost. For years now — especially
since the enactment of Dodd-Frank — the Commission has consistently
faced encroachments on its regulatory purview from prudential
regulators and, even more concerning, pressure to join the prudential
regulators in adopting the defense against “systemic risk” as part of our
mission. For the past three years I have cautioned against the SEC
rushing to join that Basel cocktail party.
It’s easy, and, to be honest, somewhat natural to see this as a turf
war. It certainly makes for a more interesting narrative than the truth,
which, frankly, is that the last thing the SEC needs is more “turf.” As
someone who’s been clamoring for a return to basic blocking and
tackling ever since my confirmation as a Commissioner three years ago,
I’m acutely sensitive to the limits of the Commission’s resources and the
very real risks of overextension. Indeed, I believe that the Commission
should find more ways to work with the Fed. We have many shared
interests and, especially on the international front, could accomplish
much if we stood together. It’s my sincere hope that the SEC and the
Fed work together to attain our shared goals — but that relationship
must be a true partnership.
I have been defending the importance of the markets and market
participants subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction, as well as the
disclosure-based regulatory paradigm through which we exercise our
authority, since the beginning of my term as a Commissioner. The move
to impose prudential regulation on our capital markets, in particular by
applying a one-size-fits-all approach to capital requirements, is nothing
short of an existential threat to those markets. If the SEC is to remain
independent and relevant for the next eighty years, we need to challenge
the prudential regulators’ encroachments on capital markets regulation.
15.

This figure includes both Dodd-Frank Act and JOBS Act rulemakings.
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For example, as I explained in detail in a speech earlier this
year, 16 it’s crucial to understand why differing types of financial
institutions need different minimum capital levels. In the banking sector,
capital requirements are rightly designed with the paramount goal of
enhancing safety and soundness, both for individual banks and for the
banking system as a whole. They serve to mitigate risk and protect
against failure, and they reduce the potential that taxpayers will be
required to backstop a failed bank in a time of stress.
In the capital markets, however, we want investors and institutions
to take risks — informed risks that they freely choose in pursuit of a
return on their investments. It is impossible to eliminate investment risk
without eliminating the corresponding opportunity for a return as well. It
would certainly be nice if the principal we invested in our capital
markets was guaranteed to be as safe as the money we deposit in our
passbook savings accounts (if such things still exist) but for the fact that
the tradeoff would be savings account-level returns on our investments.
If, like most Americans, you have been disappointed in our postrecession “recovery,” just wait until we have safe and sound,
prudentially-regulated capital markets promising us a guaranteed one
half of one percent return.
The risks posed to our capital markets by microprudential
regulation are dire in and of themselves, but they are amplified
exponentially when we factor in the risks posed by macroprudential
regulation as well. The Dodd-Frank Act ushered in an era of regulation
based on addressing systemic risk led by the unaccountable, opaque, and
prudential regulator-dominated Financial Stability Oversight Council.
I have also been warning of the dangers to our markets posed by
FSOC since the beginning of my term as Commissioner.17
16. Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Philosophies
of Capital Requirements (Jan. 15, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/
Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540629644.
17. As I explained in early 2012:

The core of bank regulation is safety and soundness… The SEC, on
the other hand, regulates markets that are inherently risky. Indeed,
the risks taken by investors are absolutely critical to capital
allocation, which in turn is critical to economic growth. The SEC
works to protect investors willing to accept the risk of securities
markets in the hopes of greater returns by ensuring that those
markets are fair and efficient, not risk-free, and does so with the
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Since that time, the imposition of a bank-oriented model of
regulation on the SEC and the markets it regulates has crossed from the
realm of the theoretical into reality. The wildly unrealistic deadlines set
in Dodd-Frank’s mandates to the Commission certainly don’t help on
this front: with almost 60 more mandates to complete, we leave
ourselves open to criticism — which, despite being misplaced, is now
rampant — that we are failing to do our part to address systemic risk.
While we toil away on rules designed with the sole purpose of providing
for the naming and shaming of the public companies that are the engines
of our economy, the prudential regulators promulgate with no costbenefit analysis rules that affect our markets and market participants —
all in the name of battling systemic risk.
Clearly, the fact that systemic risk reduction is not part of the
SEC’s mandate has not prevented such criticism. It’s important to
understand, however, that fulfilling our mandate to maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, facilitate capital formation, and protect
investors is by far the best manner by which the SEC can contribute to
the reduction of systemic risk. With the capital markets being such an
integral part of our economy, ensuring their success will have far more
of a positive effect on the integrity and soundness of our financial
system than would any action we could take as a result of abandoning
our mission in favor of regulating based on reducing systemic risk.
They say that if the only tool you have is a hammer, everything
looks like a nail. Well, for our friends at the prudential regulatory
agencies, for the past few years, it’s been Hammer Time, and when it
comes to any of the SEC’s regulated entities with any affiliation
whatsoever with a bank, their message to us has increasingly been, “U
Can’t Touch This.”18
The prudential regulators, however, have many other tools, not the
least of which has been their ability to employ loaded language to their
benefit of nearly eight decades of experience in regulating those
markets. Were FSOC to interpret its bank-oriented mandate as a
license to impose a bank-oriented model of regulation on the SEC
and the markets it regulates, the results could have a devastating
effect on markets.
Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Ongoing Regulatory
Reform in the Global Capital Markets (March 5, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171490004.
18. MC HAMMER, U CAN’T TOUCH THIS (Capitol Records 1990).
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industry? Shadow banking! That $100 you lent to your brother-in-law?
Better have good documentation of that shadow banking transaction
when the prudential regulators come calling. Shadow banking is the
perfect straw man, reducing any non-bank, and therefore nonprudentially regulated, financial transaction to boogeyman status. Who
knows what evil lurks in the heart of the shadow banking system? The
Fed knows.19
And what the Fed knows, it seems, the FSB knows as well. By
FSB, I’m referring to the Financial Stability Board, not the Russian
security agency — the successor to the KGB — that shares the FSB
acronym, although they probably know it too. The FSB is an
unaccountable, seemingly ideological, and totally opaque organization
that should frighten us all. To resolve any potential confusion, I should
point out that I’m still talking about the Financial Stability Board.
The FSB essentially serves as the implementing agency for the G20, which formed the FSB in 2009 as a much stronger alternative to the
existing Financial Stability Forum. As the organization states on its
website, “The FSB has been established to coordinate at the
international level the work of national financial authorities and
international standard setting bodies and to develop and promote the
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial
sector policies in the interest of financial stability.”20
Personally, I have grave concerns about both the mandate and
jurisdiction of the FSB. As I’ve noted, although “financial stability” is
the outcome to be expected if we do our job right, it’s not part of our
mandate. In addition, as an independent agency, the Commission is
expressly not a part of the Presidential administration, and I find it
extremely troubling to effectively be ordered about by an extension of
the G-20. Not only does the SEC not answer to the G-20, by design, we
don’t answer to the president.
Despite my misgivings, however, I believe that the SEC should
take advantage of its seat at the FSB — hopefully in conjunction with
other U.S. regulators — to advocate for strong capital markets.
Getting back to my point about loaded language, the term
“systemic risk” is also tremendously useful to prudential regulators.
After all, who could be opposed to taking measures to address potential
19.
20.

See The Shadow (CBS radio broadcast 1937-1954).
FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ (last
visited Apr. 19, 2015).
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systemic risk? Conveniently, the benefits of reducing or eliminating
systemic risk are presented as potentially infinite. So great a benefit
leads to the defenestration of economic analysis — when the benefit is
claimed to be potentially saving our entire economy from collapse, no
burden is too heavy, so a serious discussion of benefits and costs is
thrown out the window.
So, to sum up, the SEC faces a crushing burden of Congressional
mandates that will interfere with our blocking-and-tackling work for
years to come if we let them, and we face a frontal attack on our
jurisdiction as well as our very paradigm of regulation by newly formed
entities that are dominated by prudential regulators, focused on
mandates — some supranational — fundamentally different than ours.
To quote Marine legend “Chesty” Puller’s response when he was
told that his Marines were surrounded and their supply lines cut,
“They’ve got us right where we want ‘em. We can shoot in every
direction now.” 21 As Al Sommer could testify, the SEC, born in the
Great Depression following the worst stock market crash in history and
tempered by crises throughout its history, has been in tough spots
before. Like Al, I believe in our mission and I believe in our people.
What’s more, I firmly believe that despite the SEC’s tremendous
successes and hugely positive impact on our capital markets and our
economy as a whole over the past eight decades, our best days are yet to
come, provided we take action now to reassert our mission and the
importance of our independence in carrying out that mission. It is time
for the Commission to rise to these challenges instead of chasing each
exciting new issue du jour.
So what, in practice, does this mean? First, we need to affirmatively
engage Congress and the Administration and work with them to remove
the useless or counterproductive elements of the Dodd-Frank Act. The
emphasis is on affirmatively engaging — we cannot remain passive
observers, speaking only when spoken to by policymakers, and expect to
succeed in reforming Dodd-Frank. Second, we need to become a savvier
agency — specifically, an agency that serves as an efficient overseer of
the capital markets and an aggregator and analyzer of critical market
information through the better use of technology. Finally, we need to
affirmatively engage other regulators and relevant policymakers in the
critical policy debates of the day — and for that matter, of the past five
21. Gen. Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, MARINE CORPS LEGACY MUSEUM, available at
http://www.marinecorpsmuseum.org/tohonor/lpuller.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2012).
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years. I have been doing so since the beginning of my term and have
found that most stakeholders are receptive to our participation in such
debates. We can learn from their perspective, and they from ours.
Thank you for your attention as well as for allowing me to take part
in this wonderful annual tradition.

